Artin's braid groups have been recently suggested as a new source for public-key cryptography. In this paper we propose the first group signature schemes based on the conjugacy problem, decomposition problem and root problem in the braid groups which are believed to be hard problems.
Introduction
Braid groups have recently attracted the attention of many cryptographers as an alternative to number-theoretic public-key cryptography. The birthdate of braid group based cryptography can be traced back to the pioneering work of Anshel et al. in 1999 [2] and Ko et al. in 2000 [13] . Since then, braid groups have attracted the attention of many cryptographers due to the fact that, they provide a rich collection of hard problems like the conjugacy problem, braid decomposition problem and root problem and there are efficient algorithms for parameter generation and group operation [5] .
Since the construction of a Diffie-Hellman type key agreement protocol and a public key encryption scheme by Ko et al. in 2000 [13] , there have been many attempts to design other cryptographic protocols using braid groups. Positive results in this direction are a construction of pseudorandom number generator by Lee et al. in 2001 [15] , key agreement protocols by Anshel et al. in 2001 [1] , an implementation of braid computations by Cha et al. in 2001 [5] , digital signature schemes by Ko et al. in 2002 [12] , entity authentication schemes by Sibert et al. in 2002 [23] and a provably-secure identification scheme by Kim et al. in 2004 [11] .
Digital signatures bind signers to the contents of the document they sign. Group signature schemes were introduced by Chaum and van Heyst [7] to allow individual members of a group to sign messages on behalf of a group. Formally a group signature scheme has the following properties [7] :
1. only members of the group can sign messages; 2. the receiver of the signature can verify that it is a valid signature of the group, but cannot identify the signer; 3. in case of a dispute at a later stage, the signature can be opened to reveal the identity of the signer.
The salient features of group signatures make them attractive for many specialized applications, such as voting and bidding. More generally, group signatures can be used to conceal organizational structures, e.g., when a company or a government agency issues a signed statement. Group signatures can also be integrated with an electronic cash system whereby several banks can securely distribute anonymous and untraceable e-cash.
Group signatures are generalization of credential mechanisms ( [6] ) and of membership authentication schemes ( [17] , [20] ), in which a group member can convince a verifier that he belongs to a certain group without revealing his identity.
In this paper, we design some group signature schemes using braid groups. These are the first group signature schemes using braid groups.
In Section 2, we briefly review the basics of braid groups. We describe the initial system set up and some security assumptions needed for building up these signature schemes in Section 3. A group signature scheme whose security is based on the root problem is described in Section 4. In Section 5, we describe a group signature scheme that employ confirmation and denial protocols for identifying the actual signer. The security of this scheme is based on the root problem, conjugacy problem and its variants. A third group signature scheme whose security is based on the conjugacy problem and its variants is described in Section 6. The paper concludes with some general remarks in Section 7.
An Overview of Braid Groups
In this section, we briefly describe the basics of braid groups, hard problems in braid groups. A good introduction to braid groups is [3] and survey articles on braid cryptography are [14] , [8] .
Geometric Interpretation of Braids
A braid group B n is an infinite non-commutative group arising from geometric braids composed of n-strands. A braid is obtained by laying down a number of parallel strands and intertwining them so that they run in the same direction. The number of strands is called the braid index. Braids have the following geometric interpretation:
an n-braid (where n ∈ N) is a set of disjoint n strands all of which are attached to two horizontal bars at the top and bottom such that each strand always heads downwards as one moves along the strand from top to bottom. Two braids are equivalent if one can be deformed to the other continuously in the set of braids.
Let B n be the set of all n-braids. B n has a natural group structure. Each B n is an infinite torsion-free noncommutative group and its elements are called n-braids.
The multiplication ab of two braids a and b is the braid obtained by positioning a on the top of b. The identity e is the braid consisting of n straight vertical strands and the inverse of a is the reflection of a with respect to a horizontal line. Let S n be the symmetric group on n symbols. Given a braid α, the strands define a map p(α) from the top set of endpoints to the bottom set of endpoints. In this way we get a homomorphism p : B n → S n .
Presentations of Braid Groups
Any braid can be decomposed as a product of simple braids known as Artin generators σ i , that have a single crossing between the i th strand and the (i + 1) th strand with the convention that the i th strand crosses under the (i + 1) th strand. The homomorphism, p maps the generator σ i to the transposition τ i (= (i, i + 1)).
For each integer n ≥ 2, the n-braid group B n has the Artin presentation by generators σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ n−1 with relations σ i σ j = σ j σ i , where |i − j| ≥ 2, and
(2.2.1) Hence non-repeating braids are also known as permutation braids. From this lemma it follows that |D n | = n!. In this way we can identify D n with S n .
Some Special Classes of Braids
Let LB n and RB n be two subgroups of B n consisting of braids obtained by braiding left ⌊ n 2 ⌋ strands and right n − ⌊ n 2 ⌋ strands, respectively. That is,
Then we have the commutativity property that for any α ∈ LB n and β ∈ RB n , αβ = βα. These subgroups of B n are used in designing various cryptographic protocols.
Canonical Decomposition of Braids
For two words v and w in B n , we say that v ≤ w, if w = avb for some a, b ∈ B + n . Then ≤ is a partial order in B n [9] .
The positive braid, ∆ = (σ 1 . . . σ n−1 )(σ 1 . . . σ n−2 ) . . . (σ 1 σ 2 )σ 1 is called the fundamental braid. A braid satisfying e ≤ A ≤ ∆ is called a canonical factor. There is a bijection between the set of all permutation braids and the set of all canonical factors [9] . Thus a canonical factor can be denoted by the corresponding permutation π ∈ S n . By π ∆ , we mean the permutation corresponding to the fundamental braid ∆.
For a positive braid P , we say that the decomposition P = A 0 P 0 is left-weighted if A 0 is a canonical factor, P 0 ≥ e and A 0 has the maximal word length among all such decompositions. A left-weighted decomposition P = A 0 P 0 is unique [5] . A 0 is called the maximal head of P . Any braid x can be uniquely decomposed as
and the decomposition A i A i+1 is left-weighted for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 [5] . This unique decomposition is called the left canonical form of x and so it solves the word problem. Since each canonical factor corresponds to a permutation braid, x can be denoted as
Hence for implementation purposes the braid x can be represented as the tuple 
Hard Problems in Braid Groups
We use the following hard problems in our signature schemes.
Conjugacy Search Problem (CSP)
Let (x, y) ∈ B n × B n , such that y = a −1 xa, where a ∈ B n or some subgroup of B n . The conjugacy search problem is to find a b such that y = b −1 xb.
Multiple Simultaneous Conjugacy Search Problem (MSCSP)
Let (x 1 , a −1 x 1 a), . . . , (x r , a −1 x r a) ∈ B n ×B n for some a ∈ B n or some subgroup of B n . The multiple simultaneous conjugacy problem is to find a b such that,
Braid Decomposition Problem (BDP)
Let (x, y) ∈ B n × B n , where y = a 1 xa 2 for some (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ LB n × LB n . The braid decomposition problem is to find a pair (b 1 , b 2 ) ∈ LB n × LB n such that
Multiple Simultaneous Braid Decomposition Problem (MSBDP)
The multiple simultaneous braid decomposition problem is to find a pair (
Root Extraction Problem (RP)
Let x = a p , where a, x ∈ B n and p ∈ N. Then the root problem (for the exponent p) is to find a braid b ∈ B n such that b p = x.
Preliminaries
In this section, the initial system set up, intractability assumptions, some other assumptions and some notation used in this paper are given.
Initial Setup
The system parameters n and l are chosen to be sufficiently large positive integers and are made public. Since the braid group B n is discrete and infinite, we cannot have a uniform probability distribution on B n . But there are finitely many positive n-braids with l canonical factors, we may consider randomness for these braids.
Such a braid can be generated by concatenating l random canonical factors. Let,
Then |B n (l)| ≤ l(n!) l and so LB n (l), RB n (l) and B n (l) are finite sets. We use the random braid generator given in [5] (which produces random braids in O(ln) time)
for generating random braids. Also, we consider uniform probability distribution on these sets.
Let H : {0, 1} * → B n (l) be a collision free hash function. H can be constructed by composing a usual hash function of bit strings with a conversion from bit strings of fixed length to elements of B n (l). A way to construct this conversion function,
Notations
We use the following notations through out this paper.
• By a ∈ r A, we mean a random choice of an element a from the set A.
• By P Q −→ V , we mean P sends Q to V .
Group Manager
Let T be a group manager, who chooses the private key of the group and creates the public key of the group. T also manages the members of the group. T is needed in identifying the actual signer in our first and third signature schemes. T is not needed in our second signature scheme.
Intractability Assumptions
We assume that the hard problems CSP, MSCSP, BDP, MSBDP, RP, stated in Section 2.5 are intractable in braid groups. However, we assume that the conjugacy decision problem given below is easy in braid groups.
Let (x, y) ∈ B n × B n . The conjugacy decision problem is to decide whether x and y are conjugates or not, that is to decide whether there exists an a ∈ B n such that y = a −1 xa or not. The conjugacy decision problem may be solved using the algorithm given in [12] .
Some New Assumptions
In this paper, we make two assumptions. The first assumption is similar to the EDL intractability assumption used in [16] . The EDL (Equality of Discrete Logarithms) intractability assumption can be stated as follows : given x, y ∈ r G = f = g , it is computationally infeasible to determine the equality of log f x and log g y over Z n , where ord(g) = n. So we have our first assumption as
Then, given two pairs of braids (α, β) and (γ, δ) in B n × B n , it is computationally infeasible to check whether
The second assumption is about cardinalities of certain sets, which may be stated as follows.
Assumption 3.2. Let n, l be sufficiently large positive integers, α, β, γ ∈ r B n (l), a 1 , a 2 ∈ r LB n (l) and a ∈ r RB n (l). Then the cardinality of the set
is bounded below by a non decreasing function p(n, l) of n and l.
In this paper, we do not undertake any theoretical or numerical study to check the validity of the above assumptions.
Group Signature Scheme 1
In [7] Chaum et al. describe a group signature scheme using public-key systems.
In this case the group manager T chooses a public key system, gives each person a list of secret keys (these lists are all disjunct) and publishes the complete list of corresponding public keys (in random order) in a Trusted Public Directory. Each person can sign a message with a secret key from his list, and the recipient can verify this signature with the corresponding public key from the public list. Each key will be used only once, otherwise the signature created with that key gets linked. T knows all the list of secret keys, so that in case of a dispute, he can identify the signer. Hence T is needed for the setup and for opening of the signature.
We can adopt this group signature scheme directly to the braid group frame work as follows : T chooses a set E of braids and raises them to the p th power, where p is an integer greater than A problem with this scheme is that the group manager knows all the secret keys of the group members and can therefore also create signatures. This problem can be overcome by making each user to untraceably send one (or more) public keys to a public list, which will be the public key of the group. But it has to be ensured that only the group members will be able to send public keys to that list.
Although, the scheme is very elegant it has the obvious disadvantage that a key can be used only once. However, we can trivially see that the security of this scheme is equivalent to solving the root problem. Hence this group signature scheme is highly secure. This is the only cryptographic scheme on braid groups whose security depends solely on the root problem (RP).
Group Signature Scheme 2
In this section, we describe a group signature scheme which does not involve a group manager. The security of the scheme is based on the hardness of BDP, MSCSP and RP. Here the recipient of the signature can easily check whether the signature has come from a particular group or not. But the identity of the signer can not be verified unless the verifier engages in an interactive protocol with the signer as in the case of undeniable signatures.
Key Generation
Let G be a group with k members P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P k . The members of the group agree on a secret braid α ∈ B n (l). β = α 4 is published as the public key of the group. Also, each member P i of the group chooses (u i , v i ) ∈ LB n (l) × LB n (l) as his secret key. In this case, the public key of P i is x i = u −1 i βv i . We shall denote by P K the tuples (β, {x i } k 1 ) generated as above.
Signature Generation
Let m be the message to be signed. Suppose P i wants to sign m. He computes the
where y = H(m).
We shall denote by SIG(m), the set of valid signatures on m.
Confirming the Group Identity of the Signature
Given an alleged signatureŜ m , suppose that a verifier V wants to check whether it is a valid signature from the group G. V computesŜ 2 m and checks whether it is conjugate to β using the algorithm described in [12] . 
Note thatŜ

Confirmation Protocol
Suppose that a signer P i claims that a signatureŜ m was made by him. Then a verifier V first checks the group identity of the signature using the above protocol and then verifies the claim of P i by engaging in an interactive confirmation protocol with him. Let us denote the prover P i by P . WhenŜ m is a valid signature of m by P , he will be able to convince V of this fact, while if the signature is invalid then no prover even if he is computationally unbounded will be able to convince V to the contrary except with a negligible probability.
Signature Confirmation Protocol
Input : Prover: Secret keys (α, u i , v i ).
Verifier: Public key (β, {x j } k j=1 ) and allegedŜ m .
1. V chooses a ∈ r RB n (l), computes Q = a −1 (Ŝ m ) 2 x i a and V Q → P .
2. P chooses b, c ∈ r B n (l), computes R = bu i Qv . Proof. Completeness: Let S m be a valid signature. P computes
which V verifies after getting (b, c) from P and accepts the signature as valid. Hence the protocol is complete.
Soundness:
The idea is that there are many values of a which give the same value for the challenge Q and different values for the response R and a cheating prover P * has no way to distinguish between these different values of a, even if he has infinite computational power. That is, from Assumption 3.2, there are at least p(n, l) choices, for a ∈ RB n (l) which give the same value of Q but giving different values of R. Hence it is infeasible for a cheating prover P * to distinguish between these different values of a, even if he has infinite computational power. Therefore a cheating prover P * , even computationally unbounded, cannot convince V to accept S m / ∈ SIG(m) with probability greater than
. Thus the protocol is sound.
Remark 5.1. A closer examination of the protocol reveals that it has the zero-
knowledgeness property also (see [26] ).
Disavowal Protocol
If P i wants to prove to V thatŜ m is not his signature on m, he engages in a disavowal protocol with V . As in the case of confirmation protocol, we denote P i by P . In the case thatŜ m is not a valid signature, P will be able to convince V of this fact, while ifŜ m is a valid signature of P on m, even if he is computationally unbounded he will not be able to convince V that the signature is invalid except with negligible probability.
Input : Prover : Secret keys (α, u i , v i ).
Verifier : Public key (β, {x j } k 1 ) ∈ P K, y and allegedŜ m .
1. V chooses a, b ∈ r RB n (l) such that a and b commute and computes
If equality holds V acceptsŜ m as an invalid signature. Otherwise P is answering improperly. . Proof. Completeness: Assume thatŜ m / ∈ SIG(m). We have,
i βa and
Therefore,
Hence the protocol is complete.
Soundness: Assume thatŜ m ∈ SIG(m). Let R 1 and R 2 be the responses given by
In the worst case, we may regard γ as a known constant for P when he tries to determine R 2 . But then the ability to determine R 2 amounts to the establishment of an invalid signature, which contradicts Theorem 5.1 (soundness of the confirmation protocol). Hence the protocol is sound.
Remark 5.2. For the ease of analysis, the disavowal protocol was given in a non
zero-knowledge fashion. However, zero-knowledge versions of the disavowal protocol can also be constructed in a similar manner (see [26] ).
Group Signature Scheme 3
In this section, we describe another group signature scheme. This scheme is given in the usual frame work of group signature schemes as described in [19] . The security of the scheme is based on the hardnes of CSP, MSCSP and MSBDP. Here the recipient of the signature can easily verify the group identity of the signature.
However, if a dispute occurs the group manager can open the signature and identify the signer.
Setup
The group manager T chooses a secret braid s ∈ r LB n (l), k 1 , k 2 ∈ r RB n (l), and α ∈ r B n (l) and publishes x = s −1 αs as the public key of the group.
Join
Suppose now that a user P wants to join the group. We assume that the communication between a group member and T is secure, that is private and authentic.
The following protocol is performed between the user P and the Trusted Authority T .
T (s,α)
−→ P .
2. P chooses u ∈ r B n (l) , a ∈ r LB n (l) computes v = u −1 αu, w = a −1 ua and
4. P computes β 1 = az 1 a −1 and β 2 = az 2 a −1 .
Consequently, at the end of the protocol, T creates a new entry in the group database with v as the public key of the member P .
Sign
Let m be the message which has to be signed. Suppose that the group member P wants to sign m. He computes S 1 = s −1 ys and S 2 = s −1 β −1 1 yβ 2 s, where y = H(m). Signature is the pair S m = (S 1 , S 2 ).
Verify
A recipient of the signature after getting S m , checks whether S 1 is conjugate to y to check whether S m is a valid signature of y or not.
To check the group identity of the signature, V checks whether S 1 x is conjugate to yα. If it holds, V accepts S m as a signature from the group G.
Open
In case of a dispute, the group manager can identify the signer of the signaturê S m = (Ŝ 1 ,Ŝ 2 ) in the following way. He first computesŜ 3 = k 1 sŜ 2 s
2 . Now he can find out whether P is the signer by checking whetherŜ 3 v is conjugate to
Security Analysis
In this section we will show that this group signature scheme satisfies some of the properties of for an ideal group signature. 3. Anonymity: Given a group signature, to identify the actual signer is computationally hard to do for everyone but the group manager. Consider a signature on m by P . Let S m = (S 1 , S 2 ). Now S 2 = s −1 (k
2 uk 2 )s and in order to show that the signature belongs to P , a group member has to prove
There is no apparent way of proving the identity of the signer other than by getting the private keys of the signer or that of the Trusted Authority. But any group member can compute
2 uk 2 ). Now, the only way for a group memberP with secret keyv to find out the identity of the signer is to get the value of k 1 and
2v k 2 which he obtained from the group manger. But this amounts to solving a conjugacy search problem and by assumption the conjugacy search problem is hard. Hence the signature scheme is anonymous. 4 . Exculpability : The group manager does not get any information about a group member's secret key u as well as signing keys k 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we constructed three group signature schemes based on some hard problems in braid groups. Our schemes are the first in this direction using braid groups. It is open to use other hard problems in braid groups for designing more group signature schemes and other cryptographic protocols.
The first signature scheme has the property that its security is entirely depending on the root problem. This is the only cryptographic scheme on braid groups whose security is solely depending on the root problem. Root problem is believed to be harder than the conjugacy and decomposition problems. Hence we may believe that this scheme is the most secure one. The second scheme combines the notion of undeniable signatures with group signatures. Our third scheme is set in the usual frame work of group signatures.
The problem of checking the equality of factors in a 3-factor decomposition of two given braids with the middle factors known is employed in Assumption 3.1. We leave this assumption as well as Assumption 3.2 for further investigation. The first step in the investigation of the second assumption may be to the estimate of number of conjugates of a random element which are equal. Numerical experiments might throw some light on these assumptions.
The birth of braid cryptography has simulated the search for other exotic mathematical structures for doing public-key cryptography. People have started looking at other nonabelian groups [25] , [24] , [18] , [10] and combinatorial groups [22] , [21] for building public-key cryptosystems. Although, we have described our schemes in the frame work of braid groups, these protocols can be carried over to many other nonabelian groups with slight modifications. Further, one can modify these protocols to other variations of group signatures like, the ring signatures and undeniable group signatures discussed in Section 1. Hence, we hope that this study will motivate further research on digital signatures based on nonabelian groups and combinatorial groups.
